



Update

Novembre 2021 : Collecte d'informations sur l'Afghanistan

Passerell propose avec cette update une sélection de sources provenant d'articles de presse ; de rapports d'organisations internationales et de sources étatiques qui tendent à dresser un aperçu de la situation en Afghanistan.

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1 - Une situation sécuritaire extrêmement dégradée

En août 2021, le HCR a fait part de sa position sur les retours en Afghanistan en mettant en lumière la détérioration de la situation en matière de sécurité et de droits humains, en appelant tous les pays à ouvrir l'accès à leur territoire et à respecter le principe de non refoulement, ainsi qu'à suspendre le retour forcé des ressortissants ou des anciens résidents habituels d'Afghanistan.

Selon la position du HCR sur les retours en Afghanistan (août 2021) :

« Depuis le retrait des troupes internationales d'Afghanistan, la situation en matière de sécurité et de droits humains s'est rapidement détériorée dans de nombreuses régions du pays. Les Talibans ont rapidement pris le contrôle d'un nombre croissant de districts, et leur progression s'est accélérée en août 2021, où ils se sont emparés de 26 des 34 capitales provinciales de l'Afghanistan en l'espace de dix jours, pour finalement prendre le contrôle du palais présidentiel à Kaboul. Ce regain de violence a un grave impact sur les civils, notamment les femmes et les enfants. Le HCR est préoccupé par le risque de violation des droits humains contre les civils, en particulier les femmes et les jeunes filles ainsi que les citoyens afghans considérés par les Talibans comme ayant ou ayant eu des liens avec le Gouvernement afghan, les forces internationales en Afghanistan ou les organisations internationales dans le pays. »

« Étant donné que la situation en Afghanistan demeure instable et incertaine, le HCR lance un appel à tous les pays d'ouvrir l'accès à leur territoire aux civils fuyant l'Afghanistan et de respecter à tout moment le principe de non-refoulement. Il est impératif de veiller à ce que le droit de demander l'asile ne soit pas remis en cause, que les frontières demeurent ouvertes et que les personnes ayant besoin de protection ne soient pas consignées dans des zones potentiellement dangereuses dans leur pays d'origine. Ainsi, il est important de garder à l'esprit que les États sont tenus, notamment en vertu du droit international coutumier, de garantir l'accès à travers les frontières aux civils fuyant un conflit, et de ne pas renvoyer de force les réfugiés. Le principe de non-refoulement inclut le non-rejet aux frontières. »

« Étant donné que la situation en Afghanistan est instable et qu'elle pourrait demeurer incertaine pendant quelque temps, avec une crise humanitaire en cours¹⁰, le HCR exhorte les États à suspendre le retour forcé des ressortissants ou des anciens résidents habituels d'Afghanistan, y compris ceux dont la demande d'asile a été rejetée. Le moratoire sur les retours forcés reste valable jusqu'à ce que la situation se stabilise dans le pays, et que soit déterminé si le changement de circonstances permet un retour en sécurité et dans la dignité. L'interdiction des retours forcés est la norme minimale devant rester valable jusqu'à ce que la situation en matière de sécurité, d'état de droit et de droits humains s'améliore de façon significative en Afghanistan, pour permettre le retour en sécurité et dans la dignité des personnes considérées comme n'ayant pas besoin de protection internationale. »

Source

:

[https://www.refworld.org/cgi-](https://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain/opensslpdf.pdf?reldoc=y&docid=6123b5254)

[bin/texis/vtx/rwmain/opensslpdf.pdf?reldoc=y&docid=6123b5254](https://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain/opensslpdf.pdf?reldoc=y&docid=6123b5254)

En septembre 2021, le Parlement européen a adopté une résolution sur la situation en Afghanistan. Dans cette résolution, le Parlement met en lumière le fait que les conditions de sécurité dans le pays restent extrêmement précaires et appelle les États membres à une meilleure coordination pour l'évacuation des citoyens de l'Union et des Afghans en danger. Le Parlement souligne le droit fondamental des afghans à vivre en sécurité et appelle l'Union à se préparer à faire face à une éventuelle crise des migrants et des réfugiés.

Selon la résolution du Parlement européen sur la situation en Afghanistan (septembre 2021) :

« 9. **se déclare horrifié face aux violations qui ont été signalées**, notamment l'exécution de civils et de membres des forces de sécurité nationales afghanes, l'enrôlement d'enfants dans l'armée, la répression de manifestations pacifiques et de l'expression d'opinions dissidentes, les restrictions des droits de l'homme, en particulier des droits des femmes et des filles, des défenseurs des droits de l'homme, des personnes LGBTI+, des minorités religieuses et ethniques, des journalistes, des écrivains, des universitaires et des artistes; exhorte les talibans à mettre immédiatement fin à ces pratiques et à préserver en particulier les droits des femmes afghanes à l'éducation, au travail, au sport et aux libertés de circulation, de réunion et d'association, entre autres; »

« 12. **invite l'Union européenne et ses États membres à œuvrer de concert pour faciliter l'évacuation des citoyens de l'Union et des Afghans en danger**, notamment au moyen des couloirs sécurisés disponibles; rappelle que l'Union attend des talibans qu'ils facilitent cette évacuation; réaffirme la nécessité de se concentrer à cet égard sur les groupes particulièrement menacés, notamment l'ensemble des femmes et des filles, les défenseurs des droits de l'homme, les personnes LGBTI+, les minorités religieuses et ethniques, les journalistes, les écrivains, les universitaires, les agents locaux ou encore les artistes; »

Source : https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2021-0393_FR.html

1.1 - Les acteurs de persécution et le contrôle exercé sur le territoire

Le Country Guidance sur l'Afghanistan publié par l'EASO en novembre 2021 ainsi que le rapport publié en septembre 2021 par l'EASO sur la situation sécuritaire en Afghanistan font référence aux talibans, ainsi qu'aux forces de résistance et aux groupes terroristes en tant que principaux acteurs de persécutions.

Talibans

Depuis la prise de Kaboul, le 15 août 2021, les talibans ont rapidement pris le contrôle d'une grande partie du territoire afghan.

According to the report of EASO on the security situation in Afghanistan of September 2021 :

« *The Taliban, with an estimated 58 000 to 100 000 full-time fighters, 'is stronger now than at any point in the last twenty years', according to the Council for Foreign Relations. Taliban seized de facto control of Afghanistan after entering Kabul on 15 August. As of 31 August 2021, LWJ considered 388 districts to be under Taliban control, 10 under the control of resistance forces, and 9 contested.* »

« *By 15 July 2021 FDD's LWJ estimated that the Taliban was in control of 54 percent of Afghan districts, where months earlier it controlled only 20 percent. AAN explained that after the 'unexpected and highly successful sweep of rural districts in many parts of Afghanistan', the Taliban started to attack major cities such as the Taliban's Kandahar, Herat, Ghazni and Lashkargah.* »

Source :

https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2021_09_EASO_COI_Report_Afghanistan_Security_situation_update.pdf

According to the Country Guidance of EASO of November 2021:

« As of 1 October 2021, the LWJ mapping of Taliban control in Afghanistan, last updated on 15 September 2021, considered 391 districts under Taliban control, Chahar Kint district in Balkh as contested, and 15 districts in Panjshir, Baghlan, Parwan, Kapisa, Wardak, and Takhar as having guerrilla activity. »

« According to UNAMA, in 2020, the Taliban caused 3 960 civilian casualties, including 1 470 civilian deaths and 2 490 civilians wounded, which represented a 13 % increase in civilians killed, and a 31 % decrease in civilians wounded compared to 2019. The group was responsible for a 43 % increase in civilian casualties killed by non-suicide IEDs, especially through the use of victim-activated pressure-plate IEDs and vehicle-borne non-suicide IEDs »

Source : https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Country_Guidance_Afghanistan_2021.pdf

Forces de résistance

Selon le country guidance de l'EASO les forces du précédent gouvernement afghan et leurs associés auraient commis de nombreuses violations des droits de l'homme.

According to the report of EASO on the security situation in Afghanistan of September 2021 :

« Taliban gains in the north, including control of significant transportation routes, led the Afghan government to launch what it called 'National Mobilization, arming local volunteers'. In August 2021, the Afghan Interior Minister stated that the government was arming local groups 'as part of a wider three-phase plan to fight back against the Taliban's advances'. The Minister detailed that the government was supporting local volunteer militias known as 'uprising movements' and delegating power to local leaders to recruit and arm within their community to fight the Taliban. He said they had 'announced their full support to the president and government', would 'fight the Taliban along with the government forces', and 'eventually merge into the Afghan Security Forces'. Associated Press (AP) reported that the move potentially would resurrect militias 'loyal to local commanders or powerful Kabul-allied warlords, who wrecked the Afghan capital during the inter-factional fighting of the 1990s and killed thousands of civilians'. This development concerned the international community, with observers fearing the policy could lead to civil war. »

Source :

https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2021_09_EASO_COI_Report_Afghanistan_Security_situation_update.pdf

According to the Country Guidance of EASO of November 2021:

« (Former) Afghan State actors include, for example, members of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and other authorities from the three State branches (executive, legislative and judiciary). Pro- government militias (PGMs) were also considered State actors. »

« Afghan State authorities and their associates were reported to have committed a wide range of human rights violations. Sources reported on extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, arbitrary detention, kidnapping, robbery, looting, torture, and ill-treatment. Moreover, family members of Taliban fighters were intentionally killed by ANSF in retaliation for Taliban attacks against them. High level of civilian harm from the use of force during search operations ('night raids') by NDS Special Forces was also documented, including the intentional killing of civilians, some of which amounted to summary executions.

In addition, the ANP have been involved in extortion and organised crime, in particular near key smuggling routes. Recruitment and sexual exploitation of boys (bacha bazi) committed by Afghan security forces, in particular by the ALP, was also observed, as well as sexual exploitation of girls »

Source : https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Country_Guidance_Afghanistan_2021.pdf

Groupes terroristes

Le country guidance de l'EASO fait référence à plusieurs groupes terroristes qui seraient responsables de plusieurs attaques en Afghanistan. Il s'agit notamment du réseau Haqqani, l'Etat islamique dans le Khorasan (ISKP), Al Qaeda et d'autres.

According to the Country Guidance of EASO of November 2021:

*« In February 2021, UNAMA indicated **Haqqani Network** operated under the Taliban leadership and mostly followed Taliban policies and directions. The group was described as the 'lethal arm of the Taliban'*

The Haqqani Network increased its influence in areas outside of its normal operation regions in Paktika, Paktya and Khost provinces in eastern Afghanistan since Sirajuddin Haqqani, the leader of the Haqqani network, became the Deputy Leader of the Taliban in 2015 »

"The Haqqani Network is believed to have been responsible for complex attacks in heavily populated areas of Kabul during the insurgency. The Network reportedly collaborated and kept close contact with Al Qaeda, despite the US deal. According to reports, Haqqani and ISKP also worked together, including in attacks on the Afghanistan presidential inauguration and an assault on a Sikh temple in Kabul in March 2020 »

Source : https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Country_Guidance_Afghanistan_2021.pdf

According to the Country Guidance of EASO of November 2021:

*« **The ISKP** is a Salafi-Jihadist organisation and a UN-designated terrorist organisation with operational ties with local groups. Sources reported that ISKP regained strength in the first quarter of 2021, including through recruitment of disaffected Taliban members and continues to pose a threat to both Afghanistan and the wider region. »*

« The group continued to conduct deliberate attacks against civilians, in particular against members of the Hazara ethnicity and Shia Muslim religious minority and against Sikhs. High-profile attacks in 2020, for example, targeted a maternity hospital, the Jalabad city prison, Kabul University. According to UNAMA, in 2020, ISKP caused 673 civilian casualties including 213 killed and 460 wounded, which represented a 45 % decrease compared to 2019. More than 80 % of civilian casualties attributed to ISKP in 2020 were caused by attacks deliberately targeting civilians, such as civilians at educational facilities and civilians belonging to religious minority populations such as Shia Muslims and Sikhs. The majority of the civilian casualties caused by ISKP were the result of 'mass-casualty suicide attacks and mass-shootings in Kabul and Jalalabad' »

Source : https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Country_Guidance_Afghanistan_2021.pdf

According to the Country Guidance of EASO of November 2021:

« *Al Qaeda is a transnational extremist Salafi jihadist organisation and UN-designated terrorist group. Sources indicate that it maintained a limited presence in Afghanistan, carrying out its activities mostly under the umbrella of other armed groups, particularly the Taliban* »

« *According to UNAMA, Al Qaeda mainly engaged in the provision of training, including weapons and explosives, and mentoring, and they have been cited as being engaged in internal Taliban discussions over the movement's relationship with other jihadist entities. The organisation also claimed responsibility for a number of attacks in Afghanistan, leading to ANSF casualties* »

Source : https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Country_Guidance_Afghanistan_2021.pdf

1.2 - La situation sécuritaire par province

L'EASO a publié en septembre 2021 un rapport dans lequel une description de la situation sécuritaire par province est disponible. Cette description met en exergue le contrôle des Talibans et dresse une liste des exactions commises. Vous trouverez ci-dessous une sélection des provinces où le danger est particulièrement éminent et dans lesquelles plus de 200 incidents ont été répertoriés récemment.

Kabul City

According to the report of EASO on the security situation in Afghanistan of September 2021 :

« *As of 16 August 2021, an assessment of the LWJ mapping Taliban control in Afghanistan in a frequently updated map and based on open-source information, considered Kabul to be under Taliban control.*

« *According to ACLED data, between 1 March and 30 July 2021 there were 97 security incidents recorded in Kabul City, of whom 41 were coded as battles, 31 remote violence and 25 incidents of violence against civilians.*»

Source :

https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2021_09_EASO_COI_Report_Afghanistan_Security_situation_update.pdf

According to the Focus of EASO on Kaboul City security situation of June 2021 :

« *ACLED collected data on 219 violent events in Kabul district195 from 1 April 2020 to 15 May 2021 from reports in open sources, of which 55 were coded as 'battles', 121 as 'explosions/remote violence' and 43 as 'violence against civilians'* »

For further details about the situation in Kabul City :
https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/belgium/PLib/COI_Focus_Afghanistan_Security_Situation_in_Kabul_City_20210615.pdf

Balkh

According to the report of EASO on the security situation in Afghanistan of September 2021 :

« As of 31 August 2021, an LWJ assessment of Taliban control in Afghanistan in a frequently updated map and based on open-source information, considered all districts of Balkh Province to be under Taliban control except Chahar Kint that remained contested.436

According to ACLED data, between 1 March and 30 July 2021 there were 271 security incidents recorded in Balkh, of whom 184 were coded as battles, 83 remote violence and 4 incidents of violence against civilians. »

For further details about the incidents in this region :
https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2021_09_EASO_COI_Report_Afghanistan_Security_situation_update.pdf

Ghazni

According to the report of EASO on the security situation in Afghanistan of September 2021 :

« As of 31 August 2021, an assessment of the LWJ mapping Taliban control in Afghanistan in a frequently updated map and based on open-source information, considered all districts of Ghazni to be under Taliban control.

According to ACLED data, between 1 March and 30 July 2021 there were 287 security incidents recorded in Ghazni, of whom 206 were coded as battles, 64 remote violence and 17 incidents of violence against civilians.»

For further details about the incidents in this region :
https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2021_09_EASO_COI_Report_Afghanistan_Security_situation_update.pdf

Helmand

According to the report of EASO on the security situation in Afghanistan of September 2021 :

« As of 31 August 2021, an assessment of the LWJ mapping Taliban control in Afghanistan in a frequently updated map and based on open-source information, considered all districts in Helmand province to be under Taliban control.606

According to ACLED data, between 1 March and 30 July 2021 there were 420 security incidents recorded in Helmand, of whom 246 were coded as battles, 148 remote violence and 26 incidents of violence against civilians. »

For further details about the incidents in this region :
https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2021_09_EASO_COI_Report_Afghanistan_Security_situation_update.pdf

Herat

According to the report of EASO on the security situation in Afghanistan of September 2021 :

« As of 13 August 2021, an assessment of the LWJ mapping Taliban control in Afghanistan in a frequently updated map and based on open-source information, considered all districts in Herat province to be under Taliban control.656

According to ACLED data, between 1 March and 30 July 2021 there were 389 security incidents recorded in Helmand, of whom 286 were coded as battles, 67 remote violence and 36 incidents of violence against civilians. »

For further details about the incidents in this region :
https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2021_09_EASO_COI_Report_Afghanistan_Security_situation_update.pdf

Kandahar

According to the report of EASO on the security situation in Afghanistan of September 2021 :

« As of 13 August 2021, an assessment of the LWJ mapping Taliban control in Afghanistan in a frequently updated map and based on open-source information, considered all districts in Kandahar province to be under Taliban control.

According to ACLED data, between 1 March and 30 July 2021 there were 517 security incidents recorded in Kandahar, of whom 363 were coded as battles, 125 remote violence and 29 incidents of violence against civilians. »

For further details about the incidents in this region :
https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2021_09_EASO_COI_Report_Afghanistan_Security_situation_update.pdf

Kunduz

According to the report of EASO on the security situation in Afghanistan of September 2021 :

« As of 31 August 2021, an assessment of the LWJ mapping Taliban control in Afghanistan in a frequently updated map and based on open-source information, considered all districts in Kunduz province to be under Taliban control.

According to ACLED data, between 1 March and 30 July 2021 there were 240 security incidents recorded in Kunduz, of whom 186 were coded as battles, 47 remote violence and 7 incidents of violence against civilians. »

For further details about the incidents in this region :
https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2021_09_EASO_COI_Report_Afghanistan_Security_situation_update.pdf

Nangahar

According to the report of EASO on the security situation in Afghanistan of September 2021 :

*« As of 31 August 2021, an assessment of the LWJ mapping Taliban control in Afghanistan in a frequently updated map and based on open-source information, considered all districts to be under Taliban control. »*⁹⁸⁴

According to ACLED data, between 1 March and 30 July 2021 there were 388 security incidents recorded in Nangarhar, of whom 252 were coded as battles, 110 remote violence and 25 incidents of violence against civilians. »

For further details about the incidents in this region :
https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2021_09_EASO_COI_Report_Afghanistan_Security_situation_update.pdf

2- Des profils particulièrement ciblés par les persécutions

Plusieurs sources récentes, dont le Country Guidance publié par l'EASO en novembre 2021 et des publications de différents ONG telles qu'Amnesty international et Human Rights Watch, font une analyse des risques encourus par **certains profils particulièrement ciblés et mettent en lumière des persécutions.**

2.1 - Les personnes affiliées au précédent gouvernement afghan

According to the Country Guidance of EASO *« This profile includes members of the ANSF as well as civilian profiles affiliated with the government, such as civil servants and members of the judiciary »* and *« The acts to which individuals under this profile could be exposed are of such severe nature that they would amount to persecution ».*

According to the Country Guidance of EASO of November 2021:

*« ANSF personnel on duty or off-duty alike have been a priority target for the Taliban. After the Doha Agreement in February 2020, **the Taliban increased their attacks on government forces, mainly in rural areas.** Such attacks occurred in places where ANSF personnel gathered, for example, at army bases, police stations and checkpoints. ANSF members were reportedly singled out and targeted while travelling on the road, for example at mobile checkpoints. Deliberate killings and abductions were also reported, and explicitly legitimised by the Taliban Layeha (code of conduct). According to the Layeha, the Taliban were instructed to make ANSF members surrender and/or join the group. The Layeha also delegated Ta'ziri (punishment) authority to the Imam, the deputy Imam, the provincial judge or, in their absence, to the provincial governor to order the execution of an allegedly guilty ANSF detainee or any other employee/official of the government arrested by the group. Torture against detainees, including ANSF personnel, was also reported.*

Family members of security forces have also been targeted by insurgents. (...)

Judges, prosecutors, and other judicial staff have been important targets for the Taliban. (...)

There have been reports of civilians being threatened and/or killed for being employees or (perceived) supporters or spies for the government. (...) »

Source : https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Country_Guidance_Afghanistan_2021.pdf

According to oral update on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan - Statement by Michelle Bachelet, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (13 septembre 2021) :

« My Office has received credible allegations of **reprisal killings** of a number of former ANSF personnel, and reports of civilians who worked for previous administrations and their **family members being arbitrarily detained**. In some cases, the officials were released, and in others, they were **found dead**. »

Source : <https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/oral-update-situation-human-rights-afghanistan-statement-michelle-bachelet-un>

2.2 - Les personnes ayant travaillées avec ou soutenues les forces militaires étrangères

According to the Country Guidance of EASO « This profile refers to individuals who are associated with the foreign troops which were present in Afghanistan, such as interpreters, security guards, civilian contractors, administrators and logistics personnel. » and « The acts to which individuals under this profile could be exposed are of such severe nature that they would amount to persecution ».

According to the Country Guidance of EASO of November 2021:

« Over the past years, **personnel working for foreign military troops, in particular interpreters, were seen as a top priority target by the Taliban**. Article 11 of Taliban's Layeha (code of conduct) orders the execution of individuals working for Kofaar (foreign infidels), including Tarjoman (interpreters). They have also publicly defined them as criminals who actively participate in the killing of Afghan population and have stated that they shall be excluded from the Afghan society. Members of forces collaborating with foreign troops, contractors and 'spies' were seen by anti-government groups as responsible for killing Afghan civilians and were considered targets. Individuals not on the payroll of the foreign forces but doing general maintenance jobs, have not been as systematically targeted, although attacks occurred. »

Source : https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Country_Guidance_Afghanistan_2021.pdf

According to oral update on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan - Statement by Michelle Bachelet, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (13 septembre 2021) :

« In addition, we have received multiple allegations of the Taliban conducting **house-to-house searches looking for specific government officials and people who cooperated with US security forces and companies**. These searches have reportedly taken place throughout the city of Kabul, as well as Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Gardez, Maimana, Samangan and elsewhere. A number of similar incidents have affected UN staff, who report increasing attacks and threats. »

Source : <https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/oral-update-situation-human-rights-afghanistan-statement-michelle-bachelet-un>

2.3 - Les personnes fuyant l'enrôlement forcé par des groupes armés

According to the Country Guidance of EASO « *This profile refers to persons who claim to be targeted by armed groups in order to be recruited by force and against their will. Different armed groups resort to forced recruitment, including the Taliban, ISKP, as well as PGMs, etc.* ».

Moreover, according to EASO « *Forced recruitment is of such severe nature that it would amount to persecution. The consequences of refusal of (forced) recruitment could also amount to persecution (e.g. severe bodily harm, killing).* ».

According to the Country Guidance of EASO of November 2021:

« *The Taliban typically recruit unemployed Pashtun males from rural communities who are educated in madrassas.*

*The Taliban only make use of forced recruitment in exceptional cases. It is, for example, reported that the Taliban try to recruit persons with a military background, such as members of the ANSF. The Taliban also make use of **forced recruitment** in situations of acute pressure. Pressure and coercion to join the Taliban are not always violent and would often be exercised through the family, clan or religious network, depending on the local circumstances. It can be said that **the consequences of not obeying are generally serious, including reports of threats against the family of the approached recruits, severe bodily harm, and killings.***

*In rural areas with firm ISKP presence and/or where fighting is taking place, **pressure is put on communities to fully support and help ISKP.***

Forced recruitment is of such severe nature that it would amount to persecution. The consequences of refusal of (forced) recruitment could also amount to persecution (e.g. severe bodily harm, killing).»

Source : https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Country_Guidance_Afghanistan_2021.pdf

Selon un article publié par la RFI « *Afghanistan: «Les talibans essaient de convaincre les jeunes de se joindre à eux»* (26 juillet 2021)

« *Ghoreza, jeune mécanicien âgé de 19 ans, a aussi fui Kunduz. Il y a laissé son garage et ses clients. Mais la pression des talibans qui ont capturé la zone était devenue trop forte. « Dans les villages, **les talibans essaient de convaincre les jeunes de se joindre à eux**, affirme-t-il. Ils disent que l'armée, le gouvernement sont des mécréants, qu'ils sont des mauvais musulmans. Ils les manipulent psychologiquement. Ils font ça dans mon village et tout autour. J'ai fait des études, je sais qu'ils mentent. Alors j'ai toujours gardé mes distances avec eux.* »

Source : <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/asie-pacifique/20210726-afghanistan-les-talibans-essaient-de-convaincre-les-jeunes-de-se-joindre-a-eux>

Selon un article publié par l'Express « *Le calvaire d'un adolescent afghan recruté de force par les talibans* » (14 août 2021) :

« *"Ils leur demandaient de prendre les armes et de rejoindre leurs rangs. Et quand leurs parents venaient demander leur libération, ils les menaçaient avec des armes", rapporte l'adolescent vêtu de la longue chemise traditionnelle bleue.*

"Ils nous battaient. J'ai encore les marques"

"Je tremblais, je n'arrivais pas à tenir mon arme" »

Source : https://www.lexpress.fr/actualites/1/monde/le-calvaire-d-un-adolescent-afghan-recrute-de-force-par-les-talibans_2156567.html

2.4 - Les professionnels de la santé et travailleurs humanitaires, y compris les personnes travaillant pour des ONG nationales et internationales

According to EASO « *The acts to which individuals under this profile could be exposed are of such severe nature that they would amount to persecution (e.g. abduction, killing)* »

According to the Country Guidance of EASO of November 2021:

« *Already during the conflict, the Taliban increasingly tried to present themselves as a government overseeing the delivery of services, and accordingly interacted with aid organisations. However, incidents of targeting healthcare workers were reported, including killings, threats, intimidation, harassment, and abduction of healthcare personnel. (...)*

In some cases, NGO workers were targeted by insurgents as a result of their activities being perceived as non-neutral or in violation of cultural or religious norms. Other examples included targeting of people active in polio vaccination campaigns (sometimes considered as spies) or in demining programs (considered as an activity contrary to the military interests of the Taliban). It is also reported that healthcare workers were threatened to provide better services for certain communities, more specifically with regard to COVID-19 measures. (...)

In the first six months of 2021, WHO recorded 30 incidents involving attacks on healthcare in Afghanistan, affecting eight provinces and 18 districts; 22 of these attacks occurred between March and end June 2021 »

Source : https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Country_Guidance_Afghanistan_2021.pdf

2.5 - Les journalistes, professionnels des médias et défenseurs des droits humains

According to EASO « *The acts to which individuals under this profile could be exposed are of such severe nature that they would amount to persecution (e.g. killing, detention, beatings).* »

According to the Country Guidance of EASO of November 2021:

« *Already in past years, journalists, media workers, commentators and human rights defenders were targeted by anti-government armed groups as well as by former State actors, warlords, powerful local figures, and organised criminal groups. This was especially the case for those who reported on human rights issues (especially women's rights), critically covered activities of parties in the conflict, exposed corruption, criticised impunity or publicly expressed certain opinions. Journalists were often intimidated and threatened by parties in the conflict in order to cover their version of events. Women journalists were priority targets and were especially vulnerable in those regions where fundamentalist propaganda was adhered to. **There were reports of killing, beating, intimidation, detention and mistreatment of journalists***

(...) Since the Taliban takeover, Afghan journalism is reportedly facing challenges. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) claimed that around 100 media outlets had stopped operating, while hundreds of Afghan journalists had either gone into hiding or were trying to flee the country. »

Source : https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Country_Guidance_Afghanistan_2021.pdf

Selon un publication d'Amnesty international du 21 septembre 2021 :

« Des attaques contre les défenseur·e·s des droits humains sont signalées quasi quotidiennement depuis le 15 août. Les talibans frappent à toutes les portes à la recherche de ces défenseur·e·s et beaucoup n'ont eu d'autre choix que d'entrer dans la clandestinité. »

Les chercheurs d'Amnesty International se sont entretenus avec Mahmud, un défenseur afghan des droits humains qui est parvenu à quitter le pays. (...)*

Deux collègues de son ONG ont été frappés par les talibans. Les images partagées par l'un de ses collègues et authentifiées par Amnesty International et un médecin légiste montrent des marques typiques de coups de fouet dans le dos et des contusions jaunissantes sur le bras gauche de la victime. »

« Deux journalistes femmes installées à Kaboul avec lesquelles Amnesty International s'est entretenues ont raconté les menaces et les actes d'intimidation qu'elles subissent depuis l'arrivée au pouvoir des talibans. Ayesha, qui a fui la capitale après que son employeur l'a avertie que sa vie était en péril, a déclaré que les talibans se sont depuis rendus dans sa famille et ont menacé ses proches lorsqu'ils leur ont répondu qu'elle ne se trouvait pas à la maison. »*

Source : <https://www.amnesty.be/infos/actualites/article/afghanistan-talibans-perdent-temps-eradiquer-droits-humains>

2.6 - Les enfants

This profile refers to Afghan nationals under the age of 18. According to the Country Guidance of EASO of November 2021, afghan children are particularly vulnerable and **exposed to violence, harmful traditional marriage, recruitment in the military institutions, trafficking, deprivation of access to school for girls, lack of support for orphans.**

According to the Country Guidance of EASO of November 2021:

Also according to EASO's Country Guidance « **Child abuse is endemic in Afghan society. Children in Afghan families are often subjected to corporal punishment, including slapping, verbal abuse, punching, kicking, and hitting with thin sticks, electrical cables, and shoes. Sexual abuse of children also remains a pervasive problem, with girls being most frequently abused in their families or communities** »

« The practice of bacha bazi has resurfaced since the end of the Taliban regime of 1996-2001. Sources reported that young boys, with 14 as an average age, were abducted and disappeared into the practice or were traded in by their families in exchange for money. Boys involved in the practice may be subjected to violence and threats, be raped, and kept in sexual slavery. »

« Boys recruited by the Taliban were used to plant IEDs, carry explosives, collect intelligence, conduct suicide attacks, and engage in hostilities. It was also indicated that the Taliban used children as suicide bombers by manipulating them with money or false religious justifications or by forcing them. In southern provinces, the Taliban used children not only as suicide bombers but also as human shields, or to plant IEDs. »

« There are no official overall numbers regarding the percentage of **working children**, but reportedly 30 % of children in Afghanistan were engaged in child labour as of 2019, with some regional variances. Boys are predominantly (but not exclusively) engaged in child labour, and the percentage of children working increases with age. »

« In the context of the conflict, deliberate **attacks on schools** and education personnel and students by AGEs were also reported. Attacks against girls' schools carried out by both ISKP and the Taliban have been documented. »

« In general, it can be said that the Afghan **orphanage system is insufficient**, accommodating approximately 10 % of the orphans in Afghanistan. (...) Children in orphanages reported mental, physical and sexual abuse, and were sometimes victims of human trafficking. »

Source : https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Country_Guidance_Afghanistan_2021.pdf

Selon la déclaration de la directrice générale d'UNICEF Henrietta Fore « **AFGHANISTAN : LES FILLES DE PLUS EN PLUS MENACÉES PAR LE MARIAGE DES ENFANTS** » (12 novembre 2021)

« New York/Kathmandou, Kaboul, le 12 novembre 2021 – « Je suis profondément préoccupée par les informations selon lesquelles **le mariage des enfants en Afghanistan est en augmentation**. Nous avons reçu des rapports crédibles de familles offrant des filles âgées d'à peine 20 jours à un futur mariage en échange d'une dot.

Nous avons reçu des rapports crédibles de familles offrant des filles âgées d'à peine 20 jours à un futur mariage en échange d'une dot.

Avant même la dernière instabilité politique, les partenaires d'UNICEF ont enregistré 183 mariages d'enfants et 10 cas de vente d'enfants sur 2018 et 2019 dans les seules provinces de Herat et Baghdis. Les enfants étaient âgés de 6 mois à 17 ans. »

Source : <https://www.unicef.fr/article/afghanistan-les-filles-de-plus-en-plus-menacees-par-le-mariage-des-enfants>

2.7 - Les femmes

According to the Country Guidance of EASO of November 2021 « The position of women and girls in Afghanistan is characterized by deeply engrained attitudes, strong cultural beliefs and societal structures that reinforce discrimination. Gender-based human rights violations are common. »

Women in Afghanistan are **exposed to violence and harmful traditional marriage**.

Moreover, they are particularly **exposed to intimidation, threats, violence and killings when they had public role, also when they are perceived to have transgressed moral codes, perceived as Westernised, or even when they are single women or female heads of households**.

According to the Country Guidance of EASO of November 2021:

According to social customs, **women's freedom of movement is limited** by the requirement of male consent or male protection. Women who go outside alone or go to work were frequently subjected to sexual harassment in the streets.

Unmarried women face the most restrictions, particularly in rural areas, among middle and lower classes, and among Pashtuns. Living alone is, furthermore, associated with inappropriate behaviour and could potentially lead to accusations of ‘moral crimes’

*Women seeking protection faced a **gender-biased and discriminatory justice system** »*

« **Honour-based violence**, especially but not exclusively against women, is a common occurrence in Afghanistan.

Zina is a moral crime perceived in Afghanistan as shameful and can be applied to women, as well as to men. This is a broad concept of all behaviour outside the norm: sex outside marriage, illicit sexual relations, adultery and pre-marital sex. Zina can also be imputed to a woman in case of rape or sexual assault. It can lead to death threats and honour violence, including honour killings. »

« Women can be seen as ‘Westernised’ **when they work outside the home, take part in public life, or have higher education**. Women perceived as ‘Westernised’ may be perceived as contravening cultural, social, and religious norms, and **may be subjected to violence from their family, conservative elements in society and armed groups.** »

Source : https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Country_Guidance_Afghanistan_2021.pdf

According to oral update on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan - Statement by Michelle Bachelet, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (13 septembre 2021) :

« **Importantly, and in contradiction to assurances that the Taliban would uphold women's rights, over the past three weeks women have instead been progressively excluded from the public sphere.** In many areas, they are prohibited from appearing in public spaces without a male chaperone. In numerous professional sectors women face increasing restrictions.

Taliban representatives have limited girls’ access to education, with girls over 12 prohibited from attending school in several locations. »

Source : <https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/oral-update-situation-human-rights-afghanistan-statement-michelle-bachelet-un>

According to the Report by Human Rights Watch Associate Director for Women’s Rights, Heather Barr « No stability and peace without protecting women and girls » (12 octobre 2021) :

« **Women interviewed by Human Rights Watch describe living in a nightmare, as everything changed overnight, with a devastating impact on all aspects of their lives including their mental health. They are largely trapped inside their homes due to fear of the Taliban and Taliban restrictions on women’s movement, and are watching work, studies, and dreams they had devoted their lives to vanish, perhaps forever. A university student who had left her home only twice since the Taliban takeover said, “It’s not ordinary – you have no studies, no lessons, nothing. Just looking at the walls. This is like a prison.”** »

Source : <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/12/no-stability-and-peace-without-protecting-women-and-girls>

Selon un article publié par BBC « **Talibans en Afghanistan : "les femmes sont emprisonnées, tandis que les criminels sont libres** » (4 novembre 2021)

« Lorsque l'Afghanistan est tombé aux mains des talibans, **des centaines de femmes juges se sont cachées**. Les Talibans avaient ouvert des prisons dans tout le pays, libérant les hommes que les juges avaient autrefois incarcérés. »

« Une récente enquête de la BBC a révélé que plus de 220 femmes juges vivaient dans la clandestinité par **crainte de représailles** sous le régime taliban.

S'exprimant depuis des lieux secrets en Afghanistan, nombre de ces femmes ont déclaré qu'elles recevaient quotidiennement des menaces de mort. »

Source : <https://www.bbc.com/afrique/monde-59068238>

2.8 - Les minorités ethniques et religieuses

According to the Country Guidance of EASO of November 2021 **Hazara, Shia, Hindus, Sikhs and Baha'i** are ethnic and religious minorities that are exposed to persecutions and « *The acts to which individuals under this profile could be exposed are of such severe nature that they would amount to persecution (e.g. killing, abduction, sectarian attacks).* »

According to the Country Guidance of EASO of November 2021:

« For the first half of 2021, UNAMA reported a resurgence of 'deliberate sectarian motivated **attacks against the Shia Muslim religious minority**', mostly the **Hazara ethnic minority**. Nearly all 20 incidents during this period were claimed by ISKP and included shootings and non-suicide IED attacks, some involving buses and other vehicles transporting members of the Hazara community, resulting in 500 civilian casualties (143 killed and 357 injured) »

« Amnesty International documented the **Taliban massacre of nine Hazara men in Malistan district, Ghazni province, in July 2021**, noting 'Six of the men were shot and three were tortured to death, including one man who was strangled with his own scarf and had his arm muscles sliced off'. Following the brief recapture of the district by pro-government militia, around 20 Hazara residents were killed by the Taliban. In mid-July 2021, Taliban reportedly attacked two other Hazara majority districts in Ghazni: Nawur and Jaghori »

« **The Shia community has been disproportionately represented among civilian casualties in Kabul and Herat**. There are reports of attacks against the Shia, especially on places where Shia gather, such as mosques, and during religious commemorations or weddings. »

« **The ISKP reportedly sees Shias as a legitimate target for killing as they are seen as heretical**. The group continued to target Shias in 2019 and in 2020 »

« **Attacks on Hindus and Sikhs, including killings**, by ISKP in places of worship have been reported. Furthermore, Hindus and Sikhs have encountered crime incidents because of their perceived wealth, land-grabbing, societal discrimination, harassment, and some reported instances of societal violence in Afghanistan. »

« On March 2020, an ISKP- claimed gunmen **attack on a Sikh temple and housing complex in the Shorbazaar area** was reported, taking 80 people hostage, killing 26 civilians and injuring 11 more in an hours' long siege »

Source : https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Country_Guidance_Afghanistan_2021.pdf

Selon une publication d'Amnesty international du 19 aout 2021 :

« *L'équipe de recherche sur le terrain a interrogé des témoins qui ont fait un **récit terrifiant de ces homicides**, commis entre le 4 et le 6 juillet dans le village de Mundarakht, dans le district de Malistan. **Six de ces hommes ont été tués par balle et trois sont morts sous la torture, l'un d'eux ayant été étranglé avec son écharpe après avoir eu les muscles des bras tranchés.** »*

Source : <https://www.amnesty.be/infos/actualites/talibans-massacre-hazaras>

Selon une publication d'Amnesty International du 5 octobre 2021:

« ***Les forces talibanes ont tué illégalement 13 Hazaras**, dont une adolescente de 17 ans, dans la province de Daykundi en Afghanistan, après que des membres des forces de sécurité de l'ancien gouvernement se sont rendus.* »

« *Selon des témoins interrogés par Amnesty International, **les talibans ont exécuté sommairement neuf membres des ANDSF alors qu'ils s'étaient rendus**, et ces homicides pourraient constituer des crimes de guerre. Deux civils ont été tués alors qu'ils tentaient de s'enfuir, dont une adolescente de 17 ans abattue lorsque les talibans ont ouvert le feu sur le groupe rassemblé.*

*Amnesty International a authentifié des photographies et des preuves vidéo prises au lendemain de ces homicides, et a identifié le site du **village de Kahor**, où ces faits sont survenus.*

Ces exécutions commises de sang-froid prouvent une nouvelle fois que les talibans se livrent aux mêmes violations abjectes qui les ont rendus tristement célèbres lorsqu'ils étaient à la tête de l'Afghanistan, a déclaré Agnès Callamard, secrétaire générale d'Amnesty International. »

Source : <https://www.amnesty.be/infos/actualites/article/afghanistan-hazaras-tues-combattants-talibans-province-daykundi>

According to a publication of Reuters « *For Afghan Hazaras, where to pray can be life and death choice* » (21 octobre 2021) :

« *Each time Hussain Rahimi leaves his Kabul home for the mosque to pray, he recites the Kalima - a short verse that is the central tenet of Islam - because he is not sure he will come home alive.*

"I am afraid. My family is afraid when we go to the mosque," said 23-year-old Rahimi, an ethnic Hazara - a predominantly Shi'ite community that has been at the receiving end of some of the most violent attacks in Afghanistan's bloody history.

*The last two Fridays have seen **suicide bombings** at **mosques** - both attacks claimed by Islamic State (ISIS) and both targeting the minority Shi'ite sect. More than 100 people were killed in total.*

In the wake of the violence, some Hazaras are not going to the mosque at all.

With more than 400 Shi'ite mosques in Kabul alone, total security is impossible and no one knows where the next attack will come.

"Our community feels that on future Fridays, maybe Herat will explode, maybe Kabul will explode, maybe some other," said Mohammad Baqer Sayed, a university professor who has worked for the rehabilitation of victims of previous attacks.»

Source : <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/afghan-hazaras-where-pray-can-be-life-death-choice-2021-10-21/>

Selon un article publié par Human Rights Watch « *Afghanistan : Les talibans expulsent de force des membres d'une minorité chiite* » (22 octobre 2021) :

« *Des responsables talibans dans plusieurs provinces afghanes ont déplacé de force des résidents en partie pour redistribuer des terres à leurs partisans, a déclaré aujourd'hui Human Rights Watch. Nombre de ces expulsions, qui relèvent d'une punition collective, concernent les communautés chiïtes hazaras, ainsi que des personnes associées au gouvernement précédent.* »

Source : <https://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2021/10/22/afghanistan-les-talibans-expulsent-de-force-des-membres-dune-minorite-chiite>

Selon un article publié par Human Rights Watch, « *Afghanistan : Vague d'attaques de l'ISKP contre des chiïtes* » (25 octobre 2021) :

« *En Afghanistan, l'État islamique de la province du Khorasan (ISKP), un groupe armé affilié à l'État islamique (EI), mène contre la minorité religieuse chiïte des attentats à la bombe et d'autres attaques ciblées susceptibles de constituer des crimes contre l'humanité, a déclaré Human Rights Watch aujourd'hui. Ce groupe armé a également mené d'autres attaques massives, notamment l'attentat-suicide du 29 août 2021 à l'aéroport de Kaboul qui a tué 170 Afghans, pour la plupart des civils.*

L'ISKP a revendiqué de nombreuses attaques illégales contre la communauté chiïte Hazara, y compris les attentats-suicides qui ont tué au moins 72 personnes à la mosquée Sayed Abad à Kunduz le 8 octobre, et l'attentat à la bombe qui a tué au moins 63 personnes à la mosquée Bibi Fatima à Kandahar le 15 octobre.

Après l'attaque de Kandahar, l'État islamique a publié une déclaration affirmant son intention de cibler les chiïtes dans leurs maisons et leurs lieux de culte « de toutes les manières possibles, en coupant leurs cous ou faisant exploser leurs corps ... ». Le communiqué ajoutait : « Les informations sur les attaques [de l'EI]... dans les temples des [chiïtes] et contre leurs rassemblements ne sont cachées à personne, de Bagdad au Khorasan. »

Source : <https://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2021/10/25/afghanistan-vague-dattaques-de-liskp-contre-des-chiites>

According to a publication of Al Jazeera « *Why the Hazara people fear genocide in Afghanistan* » (27 octobre 2021) :

« *In the aftermath of the withdrawal of international troops from Afghanistan, violence against the Hazara population has escalated. With a long history of persecution, including by the Taliban, the Hazaras are right to fear a genocide.*

While the Taliban and other armed groups are targeting and committing human rights violations against the people of Afghanistan, the Hazara ethnic and religious population is especially at high risk.

*In late September and early October, reports in Western media emerged of **mass “evictions” of Hazara people from their ancestral homes and lands** in Daykundi province. Taliban fighters forced over 4,000 Hazaras from their homes, claiming they had no ownership over their land, leaving them stranded without food or shelter as harsh winter approaches. In Mazar-e-Sharif, a local Taliban court decided to expel some 2,000 families, again based on false claims that they do not own their homes.*

*By now there is a clear pattern of Taliban atrocities being committed across Afghanistan, which could mean that **the Hazaras may be facing imminent ethnic cleansing.**»*

Source : <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/10/27/why-the-hazara-people-fear-genocide-in-afghanistan>

2.9 - Les personnes nées en Iran ou au Pakistan, ou y ayant vécu pour une longue période

According to the Country Guidance of EASO of November 2021:

« Over 8 million Afghans have returned to the country since 2002, mainly from neighbouring Iran and Pakistan. Returnees from Iran were reported to comprise mostly young men, whereas returnees from Pakistan were mostly families. Many of them settled in Kabul regardless of their place of origin in Afghanistan, and without any government support settled according to their capacity. A third of all Afghan returnees have settled in Kabul and Nangarhar.

This fact, combined with high numbers of IDPs, resulted in high pressure on housing, employment, healthcare, and community services, especially in the cities. In the context of Afghanistan’s limited absorption capacity returnees often lived in precarious situations.

Not being accustomed to Afghan norms and expectations and having no support network in Afghanistan may add to the difficulties in finding job or shelter. Afghans who lived outside Afghanistan for a long period of time may also have a strong accent, which would be a further obstacle in finding a job.

Afghans who grew up in Iran and are perceived as ‘Iranised’ or ‘not Afghan enough’ may sometimes receive offensive comments. »

Source : https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Country_Guidance_Afghanistan_2021.pdf